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Anotácia:  
V článku je navrhnutá metóda výpočtu intenzity nebezpečných porúch bezpečnostne kritického riadiaceho 
systému priamo z rozdelenia pravdepodobnosti stavov absorpčného Markovovho reťazca so spojitým časom. 
Článok sa špecificky zameriava na absorpčné Markovove reťazce s viac než jedným absorpčným stavom. 
Navrhnutá metóda je na záver aplikovaná v konkrétnej prípadovej štúdii analýzy bezpečnostne kritického 
systému. 
 
Annotation: 
This paper introduces a method of evaluating the hazardous failure rate of a safety relevant control system if the 
state probability distribution is given as a result of an absorbing Continuous Time Markov Chain analysis. 
Markov Chains with more than one absorbing state are contemplated and eventually the case study is presented. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Specific applications of control systems are closely 
related to a risk that outcomes of a control system 
failure could jeopardize the safety of a controlled 
process. A system is in those cases required to fulfil 
not only necessary control functions, but also safety 
or protective functions. Requirements on safety of a 
system are evaluated by means of a safety integrity 
level. Systems with those properties are referred to as 
safety related control system (SRCS). 
The safety integrity level (SIL) has to be defined for 
every safety related function and it has to cover 
systematic failures as well as random failures [1]. 
The random failure integrity is in the case of 
electronic systems often achieved by massive 
redundancy application, which allows detection of a 
failure and negation of its consequences. Evaluation 
of the achieved SIL is based on quantitative methods.  
In general, random hardware failures mainly affect 
the technical safety of the system [1] 
Required systematic failure integrity is usually 
reached by means of application of techniques used 
for systematic failures avoidance. Given serious 
problems when trying to assess reliability attributes 
of the systematic failures, it is virtually impossible to 
put quantitative methods into practice.  Appraisal of 
the SIL is based on qualitative methods in this case. 
Systematic failures in the most cases affect the 
functional safety of the system [1]. 
There are four safety integrity levels specified (SIL1 
to SIL4) in the standard [1] or in standards derived 
from it ([2] for instance). Numerically, those levels 
have meaning of tolerable hazard rate per safety 
related function. If an occurrence of a hazard is 
equated with an occurrence of a hazardous failure 
then hazardous failure rate per safety relevant 
function has to be determined instead. 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
The SRCS must be proved to fulfil all functional 
safety and technical safety requirements before being 
installed into an operation 3. In another words, 
actual properties of the SRCS have to be compared 
with specification of safety requirements (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1:  Safety assessment principles 
 
Functional safety requirements check can be done by 
the means of various test methods (e.g. module tests, 
integration tests, factory acceptance tests, site 
acceptance tests) and/or formal (semiformal) 
verification technique [5]. 
Technical safety requirements check cannot be based 
only on tests, but theoretical procedures and 
quantitative analysis methods have to be utilised 
instead [8]. Methods originally developed for the 
evaluation of dependability parameters can be 
successfully used to accomplish this goal (e.g. RBD, 
FTA, Markov Chains, Petri Nets).  
Methods such as RBD and FTA are commonly used 
for the evaluation of safety parameters. The 
simplicity is their strong advantage; however in 
particular cases these methods suffer from inaccurate 
results. The use of these methods is limited to the 
analysis of items without possibility of recovery after 
a failure and with fundamental assumption that the 
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item can always be either in operational state or in 
complete non-operational state (or a safe state and a 
hazardous state when the safety is to be analysed). 
This assumption prevents us from considering more 
complexities affecting the safety of a system in the 
safety analysis (for instance failure rate, failure 
detection time, diagnostic coverage, reconfiguration 
of a system after a detection of a failure, system 
recovery etc.) [6]. 
More appropriate results of the safety analysis could 
be achieved by means of Markov Chains [7]. 
THEORETICAL BASIS 
Random occurrence of the hardware failures can be 
considered to be a continuous stochastic process. In 
general, an analysed system can be in any state which 
belongs to a set S of states. If the change of the state 
is caused by an influence of any of the factors 
affecting the safety of the system and if Markovian 
property holds [3], then this system can be interpreted 
by the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). 
The Markov analysis integrates qualitative as well as 
quantitative approach. The main task of the 
qualitative part of the analysis is to specify a state 
space of the analysed system. Number of states in the 
state space is a function of parameters considered in 
the analysis (e.g. faults, diagnostic properties and 
recovery), number of units in the system (the depth of 
decomposition) and also possibility of 
reconfiguration of the system after detection and 
negation of the failure. The goal of quantitative 
analysis is to evaluate what is the probability of the 
system being in the hazardous state. However, 
knowledge of the probability of the occurrence of 
hazardous state does not imply SIL of the system, 
since SIL is quantified through the hazardous failure 
rate of the system. When dealing with the CTMC 
with more than one absorbing state, evaluation of the 
hazardous failure rate of the system could be rather 
difficult. 
The CTMC model which encompasses hardware 
failure outcomes and effects on safety of the SRCS 
has a default state - a failure-free state of the system. 
The CTMC has to contain at least one absorbing state 
which represents the hazardous state of the system. 
When there are more absorbing states present in the 
CTMC model, all of them could be eventually 
merged into two distinctive absorbing states (Fig. 2). 
Those are: 
 hazardous state (referred to as H in Fig. 3 to 
7); 
 safe state (referred to as S in Fig. 3 to 7), 
which is reached after the detection and 
negation of the failure. 
 
 
Fig. 2: General approach to the Markov modelling of a SRCS 
 
There is an exact relation between the probability of 
the hazardous state and the hazardous failure rate 
which depends on particular probability distribution 
of a random variable. For continuous stochastic 
process we can state  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
where λ(t) is a failure rate and F(t) is a probability 
distribution function. 
Every Markov Chain with only one absorbing state 
(Fig. 2) could be replaced by an equivalent diagram 
as pictured in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Equivalent CTMC with one absorbing state 
 
Diagram in Fig. 3 can be described by means of 
differential equations system (2) and its initial 
probability distribution P(t = 0) = {1,0}. 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
where  λH (t) is a hazardous failure rate. 
The probability of the system being in the H state has 
properties of the probability distribution function, 
therefore 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
The diagram (Fig. 2) with two absorbing states could 
also be replaced by an equivalent diagram. This case 
is represented by the diagram in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4: Equivalent CTMC with two absorbing states 
 
If λS (t) ≥ 0 then PH(t) cannot be considered to be 
probability distribution function (for t = ∞ there is  
PH(t) < 1, therefore (3) cannot be used to evaluate 
hazardous failure rate of the system. 
Let us state: 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
It is also valid that: 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
Considering (3), (4), (5), (6) and the fact that the 
probability  PHS(t)  has properties of the probability 
distribution function, following statement holds: 
 
 
 
 
(7) 
CASE STUDY 
Let us assume SRCS which is composed of two 
independent channels A and B which are identical in 
hardware architecture (Fig. 5) and they both control 
the controlled object CO. Channel A consists of 
sensor SA and unit UA; channel B consists of sensor 
SB and unit UB. The system would be in hazardous 
state only if both channels failed. Let us further 
assume that the failure rate of the random failures is 
constant and moreover λA = λB = λ (which are actual 
assumptions when coping with a system composed of 
electronic elements). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: The SRCS with 2-out-of-2 structure 
 
If the system is not equipped with any failure 
detection mechanism then transition from the failure-
free state F to the hazardous state H as a consequence 
of random failures can be modelled by diagram in 
Fig. 6. The system would be in the N state if only one 
channel has failed (either A or B). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: The CTMC model of the system without the failure 
detection mechanism 
 
The CTMC in Fig. 6 is mathematically described by 
the differential equations system (8) and initial 
probability distribution  P(t = 0) = {1,0,0}.  
 
 
 
 
(8) 
where P(t = 0) = { PF(t), PN(t), PH(t)} is the time-
dependent probability distribution and A is the 
infinitesimal generator matrix (9). 
 
 
 
 
 
(9) 
If we analytically solved (8) for  PH(t), the result 
would be:  
 
 
 
 
(10) 
Consequently derived transition rate from the failure-
free state (the F state) to the hazardous state (the H 
state) would be: 
 
 
 
 
(11) 
However, if the system (Fig. 5) is equipped with 
failure detection and negation mechanism, then after 
the detection and negation of the failure it could reach 
the safe state (the S state in Fig. 7). This state could 
be abandoned only if the failure had been repaired 
and obligatory administrative measures had been 
carried out (this process has no primary impact on the 
SIL, therefore is not considered in Fig. 7). The failure 
detection is usually preformed by the means of data 
comparison of both units, so cross-communication 
between units is necessary. The CTMC model (Fig. 
7) is constructed with the assumption that all 
potentially hazardous failures are covered by the 
failure detection mechanism. 
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Fig. 7: The CTMC model of the system with the failure 
detection mechanism 
 
The failure detection and negation rate can be 
determined from: 
 
 
 
 
(12) 
where tD is time to detection of the failure and tN is 
time needed to negate its possible consequences 6. 
Probabilities of the system being either in the H state 
or in the S state are given by (13) and (14) 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
(13) 
 
 
 
 
(14) 
Time-dependent probability of the hazardous state of 
the system (the H state) as a function of the failure 
detection and negation rate is shown in Fig. 7 (for  λ 
= 5.10-4 h-1). 
 
 
Fig. 8: Probability of the hazardous state of the system 
 
Furthermore and with respect to (7), following 
equation can be derived (15). 
The time-dependent hazardous failure rate as a 
function of various failure detection and negation 
rates δ is shown in Fig. 8 (assuming λ = 5.10-4 h-1). 
The plots in Fig. 8 imply that 2-out-of-2 system with 
structure according to the Fig. 7, with failure rate λA = 
λB = λ = 5.10
-4 h-1  and time to detection and negation 
of the failure  δ = 1 h, meets requirements that are 
laid down on SIL2 category system (when only 
random failures of a hardware are considered). In 
accord with the standard 1 or 2, value of the 
hazardous failure rate must be within the range 
specified (which is 1.10-6 h-1  to 1.10-7 h-1 for SIL2). 
Reduction of the hazardous failure rate in order to 
increase the SIL can be achieved by cutting down on 
a failure rate of the system or decreasing the time 
needed to detect and negate the failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(15) 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Hazardous failure rate 
CONCLUSION 
 
The approach introduced in this paper was used for 
appraisal of random hardware failure modes effects 
on the safety integrity of electronic interlocking 
systems   used in ŽSR operation.  However, the 
systems in question are more complex than the case 
study above and embrace a wider range of levels of 
control. 
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